Financing for infectious disease outbreak preparedness and response is characterized by at least three problems: it is insufficient, irregular and difficult to track. Health crises funding is characterized by periods of panic, with robust national and international funding during emergencies, followed by neglect. The estimated costs of global preparedness, around 4.5 billion USD annually, are a fraction of those of health emergencies (the West African Ebola crisis and SARS cost an estimated 53 and 60 billion USD, respectively). A complete picture is not yet clear, but some estimates have put the economic losses caused by Covid-19 at 4.7 trillion USD. Sustained financing is also needed for global public goods (or global common goods) that can potentially benefit all countries, such as the operating costs of WHO and countermeasure R&D, but arrangements to do so largely rely on discretionary, voluntary contributions that are neither sufficient nor reliable.

Furthermore, tracking financial flows for preparedness and response is challenging. At the national level, spending often spans many different budget lines and ministries, and is not comprehensively tracked in most countries. At international level, it is difficult to get detailed, thorough and timely information on the many channels of relevant public and private financial flows.


Several new financing mechanisms were launched in recent years, such as CEPI, the WHO’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE), and the World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF). However, all of them largely depend on voluntary contributions from the same small group of governments, and cannot guarantee adequate or sustainable financing.

This occurs partly because they were created under the assumption that lower-income countries would be the ones most in need of financial assistance in health emergencies, whereas the economic fallout from Covid-19 has affected all countries. In high-income countries, domestic economic rescue packages amounting to trillions of US dollars were approved. The World Bank pledged to make 160 billion USD available to countries in need of external financing. The IMF also provided 109 million USD in financial assistance and 726 million USD in debt relief, and G20 finance ministers announced countries could request to suspend debt payments until December 2021.

In terms of monitoring financial flows internationally, the Georgetown Global Health Security Tracking project offers expansive and detailed information on investments that it counts as contributing to “global health security.” However, there is no single international definition of the types of spending that should or should not qualify as contributing to preparedness or response.


At the national level, reform panels agree that countries must establish channels of predictable and sustainable financing for preparedness and response¹ ² ⁴. Regarding the patchy and unstable global health financing system, some panels recommend the creation of a financing mechanism for pandemic preparedness based on ability to pay and separate from development assistance¹ ². All highlight the importance of increasing and ensuring stable financing for global-level institutions. The need for a replenishment mechanism of the CFE and for a redesign of its disbursement criteria was also proposed³.

Regarding the mechanisms created to address the Covid-19 pandemic, it has been recommended that countries commit to fully financing initiatives such as the ACT-Accelerator, including Covax¹ ². However, contributions are discretionary and unpredictable. As of June 2021, the ACT-A had US$ 17.7 billion in funding commitments, which still left a gap of US$ 16.8 billion for 2021.


As Covid-19 has exposed many weaknesses in national health systems, discussions on how to strengthen national financing have started in some countries.

At the global level, the WHO Member State Working Group on Sustainable Financing was created in January 2021, and is discussing the functions of WHO that should be funded in a sustainable manner and possible approaches to doing so. In addition, WHA resolution 74.7 urged Member States to secure adequate and sustainable financing for the WHO, including its Health Emergencies Programme. It also encouraged both the Director-General and Member States to, respectively, support and follow the recommendations of the WHO Working Group on Sustainable Financing. It also requested the DG to assess the role and strategy of the CFE and consider implementing a sustainable financing and replenishment mechanism for it.

In July 2021, the G20 High Level Independent Panel (HLIP) on Financing the Global Commons for Pandemic Preparedness and Response released its findings, calling for $15 billion per year in additional international public investment including through the creation of a Global Health Threats Fund.

Finally, debates on a possible legally-binding instrument for pandemic preparedness and response include consideration of possible financing mechanisms. However, negotiations on such a framework have not yet begun, and the extent to which countries will commit to binding financing obligations remains to be seen.

* This section is derived from a systematic comparison (available here) of recommendations from four international reviews: ¹ the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (GPMB), ² the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response (IPPPR), ³ the Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee (IOAC) for the WHO Health Emergencies Programme, and ⁴ the International Health Regulations (2005) Review Committee.


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WHA74 Resolution 74.7: Strengthening WHO preparedness for and response to health emergencies

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Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee for the WHO Health Emergencies Programme

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GPMB Statement ahead of the 74th World Health Assembly


COVID-19: Make it the last pandemic, Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response


Financing pandemic preparedness and response, IPPPR

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Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) during the COVID-19 response

(from newest to oldest)


G20 Leaders Declaration (31 October 2021)


Global public goods for health: Weaknesses and opportunities in the global health system, Moon S, Røttingen J el al.


Strengthening Global Health Security and Reforming the International Health Regulations, Blinken AJ and Becerra X 


Investing for a rainy day: challenges in financing national preparedness for outbreaks, Moon S and Vaidya R


Report of the G20 High Level Independent Panel on Financing the Global Commons for Pandemic Preparedness and Response: A Global Deal for our Pandemic Age


CEPI—a new global R&D organisation for epidemic preparedness and response, Børge B, Farrar J et al.

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Always fighting the last war? Post-Ebola reforms, blindspots & gaps in COVID-19, Bezruki A and Moon S


The Neglected Dimension of Global Security: A Framework to Counter Infectious Disease Crises, Commission on a Global Health Risk


Global common goods for health: Towards a new framework for global financing, Kickbusch I and Soucat A